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WVILLrAM R. VANCE 
The twenty-two years that have passed since the Supreme Court of 
the United States handed down its opinion in the case of Northern 
Assurance Co. v. Grand View Building Assoc.' have done little to clear 
away the wordy fog which that famous case did so much to raise 
about the doctrines of waiver and estoppel in insurance law. Stripped 
of trappings, the main point determined by that case was that an 
insurance company might deliver to an honest applicant for insurance 
a piece of paper having the appearance of an insurance policy, take 
from him the price of a sound contract, and leave him under the belief 
that he had actually secured the protection for which he had applied 
and paid, and still be allowed in an action at law to show that, by 
reason of the breach2 of a condition precedent, known all the time to 
its officiating agent, it had assumed no obligation to pay. Incidentally, 
in assessing the fireside equities, one recalls that in practice the insurer 
would not be required to return the premium unless the occurrence of a 
loss should afford unhappy occasion to the duped applicant to learn 
that he had received no consideration for his premium payment. The 
essential inequity of this result was recognized when in a later appeal 
(1902) I83 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct. I33. ".... The case of Union Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, and the other cases in the Supreme Court of the United 
States along the same line, were 'distinguished' in name, but in fact were over- 
ruled, and the Wilkinson Case was almost in terms overruled." Hill, C. J., in 
People's Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Goyne (I906) 79 Ark. 315, 96 S. W. 365. This masked 
reversal of opinion had been foreshadowed by vigorous dictum. in New York Life 
Ins. Co. v. Fletcher (i886) rI7 U. S. 5X9, 6 Sup. Ct. 837, but in. that case the 
diseased insured was, in effect, joining the unfaithful agent of the insurer in an 
attempt to defraud the insurer, and therefore in no position to claim an equitable 
estoppel. In Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain (i889) I32 U. S. 304, IO 
Sup. Ct 87, the opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan shows a tendency to return to the 
doctrine of the Wilkinson case, but in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moore (i9i3) 231 
U. S. 543, 34 SuP. Ct. i86, the Supreme Court expressly discredited, if it did not 
overrule, not only the Wilkinson case, but also the Chamberlain case. In the most 
recent decision of the Supreme Court in which the Northern Assurance Co. case 
was cited with approval, Mitt. Life Ins. Co. v. Hilton-Green (I9i6) 24i U. S. 
6I3, 624, 36 Sup. Ct 676, 68o, the insured participated in the fraud of the insurer's 
agents, and therefore was clearly not entitled to claim an equitable estoppel. 
' The use of the expression ~'breach of condition" is objectionable inasmuch as 
it suggests a breach of duty, whereas a condition seldoms imposes a duty. It 
usually confers only a privilege which may be exercised or not at the option of the 
person to whom it is given. For such a condition the term "non-fulfillment" 
would seem more appropriate. But there are other conditions which involve states 
of fact or events beyond the control of the parties to the contract. For these the 
words "non-existence" and "non-occurrence" are more fitting. In the interest 
of simplicity and brevity of statement it is thought better to use the customary 
phrase "breach of condition" as connoting conventionally all of these several 
concepts. 
[8343 
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in a case involving the same transaction and the same parties, the 
Supreme Court held that the insured was entitled to his money if only 
he went about getting it in the right way, viz.,. by a bill in equity to 
reform the contract.3 
An attempt to state more specifically the issues determined by this 
famous case proves difficult, as the confused opinion resists analysis. 
The opinion states4 that "The question before us is therefore reduced 
to one of waiver." Nowhere does the opinion indicate that the 
writer, Mr. Justice Shiras, appreciated a possible distinction between 
waiver of a known defense and estoppel to set up an inequitable defense, 
a distinction previously made with reasonable clearness in Union 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson-5 and subsequent cases. Even when he 
uses language competent to describe an estoppel, he understands only 
a waiver. After stating the doctrine of estoppel as established by the 
New York cases, he comments :6 "This mode of reasoning overlooks 
both the general principle that a written contract cannot be varied or 
defeated by parol evidence, and the express provision that no waiver 
shall be made by the agent except in writing indorsed on the policy." 
Again, after stating the plaintiff's claim of estoppel thus,7 "The 
plaintiff's case stands solely on the proposition that because it is alleged, 
and the jury have found, that the agent had notice or knowledge of 
the existence of insurance existing in another company at the time 
the policy in suit was executed and accepted, and received the premium 
called for in the contract, thereby the insurance company is estopped 
from availing itself of the protection of the conditions contained in the 
policy," he proceeds to interpret it as a mere waiver;8 "In other 
words, the contention is that an agent with no authority to dispense 
with or alter the conditions of the policy could confer such power 
upon himself by disregarding the limitations expressed in the contract, 
those limitations being according to all the authorities presumably 
known to the insured." The opinion laboriously establishes that the 
parol evidence rule, prohibiting the alteration or contradiction of 
written contracts by proof of prior or contemporaneous parol agree- 
ments, applies to insurance contracts, and then appears to rest its 
decision in favor of the defendant on the ground that since the insured 
was bound to know the limitations imposed by the policy upon the agent's 
authority, the insurer was not bound by the agent's implied waiver at 
the time of delivering the policy. It is obvious, however, that if the 
facts are to be interpreted as a waiver, or an implied agreement in 
modification of the policy made at the inception of the contract, the 
'No. Assur. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Assoc. (I9o6) 203 U. S. io6, 27 SUp. Ct 
27, affirming s. c. (i906) 73 Neb. 149, 102 N. W. 246. 
1 x83 U. S. at p. 3I7, 22 Sup. Ct. 136. 
(187I, U. S.) I3 Wall. A. 
1i83 U. S. at p. 328, 22 SUp. Ct 140. 
' 183 U. S. at p. 362, 22 Sup. Ct. 153. 
I83 U. S. 363, 22 Sup. Ct. 153. 
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question of the authority of the agent making the agreement is imma- 
terial. A parol agreement made at the time of delivering the policy 
would be wholly ineffective to modify its terms, whether made by 
the president of the company or the office boy. And such was the 
decision in Lumber Underwriters v. Rife.9 The point really determined 
by the long and tortuous opinion of the court would seem then to be 
that the alleged estoppel was but a claim of waiver at the delivery 
of the policy; that such waiver was but an implied parol agreement in 
contravention of the terms of the policy, and therefore could not be 
shown. It would seem, then, to follow that the long discussion of 
the effect of the limitations upon the agent's authority to waive, 
however material it would have been if the alleged waiver had 
occurred subsequently to the delivery of the policy, was, under the 
facts of this case, quite unnecessary. 
Prior to the decision of the Northern Assurance Co. case, the courts 
of most of the states10 had either expressly accepted or referred with 
approval to the doctrine laid down in I87i by Mr. Justice Miller in 
Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson,"- which, in turn, followed 
some earlier New York cases,2 that even in an action at law on the 
policy testimony might be received to show that a breach of condition 
precedent to the inception of the policy upon which the insurer relied 
to defeat the claim of an honest insured, was known to the insurer or 
his agent at the time the policy was delivered, and that the insurer was 
thereby estopped from claiming the benefit of such a dishonest defense. 
It is quite true that in the Wilkinson case and those following it the 
reasons given for admitting such evidence were frequently confused, 
and the theory of equitable estoppel to deny the asserted validity of the 
contract was sadly confused with that of waiver of a privilege under 
the contract, yet the course of actual decision was fairly consistent, 
and through the confused language of the opinions there can clearly 
be discerned, the persistent idea that the insurer should not be allowed 
by his actions to assert the validity of the policy when taking the 
insured's money, and deny it when called upon to pay his loss.'3 
9(19I5) 237 U. S. 605, 35 SUP. Ct. 717. 
' See the vast array of cases cited in 3 Cooley, Briefs om; lsurance (igo5) :262 
et seq., and in 32 C. J. 1343, note 66. Many others might be added. 
"Supra note 5. 
"Plunb v. Cattarawigus Co. Mitt. In=s. Co. (i858) i8 N. Y. 392; Rowley v. Ins. 
Co. (i867) 36 N. Y. 550. 
See Cue v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. (19I3) 89 Kans. go, 130 Pac. 664, in which the 
court quotes with approval the opinion of Ladd, J., in Gurnett v. Ins. Co. (1904) 
124 Iowa, 547, 549, ioo N. W. 542, 543, as follows: "The law is charitable enough 
to assume, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that an insurance 
company intends to execute a valid contract in return for the premium received; 
and when the policy contains a condition which renders it void at its inception, and 
this result is known to the insurer, it will be presumed to have intended to waive 
the condition, and to execute a binding contract, rather than to have deceived the 
insured into thinking his property is insured when it is not, and to have taken his 
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In several of the states this course of decision was seriously disturbed 
by the Northern Assurance Co. case. The great prestige of the 
Supreme Court, coupled with the apparently exhaustive consideration 
of the question in that case, caused some of the state courts to recon- 
sider the matter and to follow the federal supreme court in its 
changed ruling. But the revulsion came quickly.14 The wavering 
courts returned to their earlier precedents and it is believed that at 
the present time such parol estoppels may be shown in the courts of 
every state'5. of the Union except Massachusetts:' and New Jersey.'7 
These two states have consistently refused to admit offered proof of 
such estoppels on the ground that to do so would be to violate the 
money without consideration." See also the picturesque opinion of Doe, C. J., in 
DeLancey v. Rockingham Fire Ins. Co. (1873) 52 N. H. 58i. 
"4Compare Maupin v. Scottish Union Ins. Co. (1903) 53 W. Va. 557, 45 S. E. 
1003, with Medley v. German Alliance Ins. Co. (904) 55 W. Va. 342, 47 S. E. 
ioi. Both cases contain elaborate discussions of the Northern Assurance Co. case, 
a majority of the court approving it in the former case, and refusing to follow 
it in the latter. The Maupia case, however, did not involve an estoppel such as 
was denied in the Northern Assurance Co. case, but an attempted parol waiver at 
the time of the issuance of the policy, which was very properly held inadmissible. 
In Sfate Mitd. Ins. Co. v. Craig (i9io) 27 Okla. 90, III Pac. 325, the court 
repudiated the Federal rule applied in Sullivan v. Merc. Mitt. Ins. Ca. (r908) 20 
Okla. 460, 94 Pac. 676, the trial of the latter case having taken place before 
Oklahoma became a state. See also People's Fire Ins. Co. v. Goyne, supra note I; 
Leisei& v. St. Paul F. & M. Its. Co. (1910) 20 N. D. 3i6, It N. W. 837, over- 
ruling Lamb v. Merchants' Nat. Ins. Co. (i9go) i8 N. D. 253, ii9 N. W. 0o48. 
See also Pearlstine v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (i9q6) 74 S. C. 246, 54 S. E. 372; Virginia 
F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Richmond Mica Co. (1904) i02 Va. 429, 46 S. E. 463; 
Welch v. Fire Assoc. (I1O4) 120 Wis. 456, 98 N. W. 227. 
" See notes IO and 14 SUpra. Quite a number of decisions cited as following 
the Northern Assurance Co. case merely accept the rule stated in that case that the 
insurer cannot be estopped by the unauthorized acts of its agents. See Iverson v. 
Met. Life Ins. Co. (io7) I51 Calif. 746, 9i Pac. 609; Layton v. N. Y. Life Is. 
Co. (192r) 55 Calif. App.' 202, 202 Pac. 958; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Patten 
(I92i) i5i Ga. i85, io6 S. E. i83; Forwood v. Prudential Ins. Co. (i9r2) II7 
Md. 254, 83 Ati. i69; Tuttle v. Pac. Mit. Ins. Co. (IWO) 58 Mont. 12, i19 Pac. 
993. The courts of Rhode Island still reluctantly maintain the obsolescent doctrine 
that the soliciting agent is to be regarded, in so far as he aids in preparing the 
application, as the agent of the insured, and not -of the insurer. Salvate v. 
Firemen's Its. Co. (i19o) 42 R. I. 433, io8 Atl. 579; RJeed v. Equitable F. & M. 
Ins. Co. (I892) 17 1 I. 785, 2 Atl. 833. But this rule does not apply to the 
insurer's medical examiner while acting in the scope of his employment. Leo nard 
v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. (igo2) 24 R. I. 7, 51 AtE 1049. In Georgia it is 
curiously held that the insurer may be estopped by the unauthorized acts of his 
agent in making life, but not fire insurance contracts. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Patten, supra. But in none of these cases is it denied that the insurer may be 
estopped by the acts of a competent agent to claim a forfeiture from a known 
breach of condition. 
"Harris v. No. Amier. Ins. Co. (I905) I9o Mass. 36i, 77 N. E. 493; Batchelder 
v. Queen Ins. Co. (i883) 135 Mass. 449. 
" Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Martin (1878) 40 N. J. L. 568; Dezuees v. Man- 
hattan Ins. Co. (x872) 35 N. J. L. 366. 
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so-called parol testimony rule. The English courts also still maintain 
with less of certainty the same position.'8 
The inferior Federal courts sitting in states where the doctrine of 
parol estoppels is accepted by the state courts as a matter of course, 
and yet compelled to follow the Federal rule because a question of 
general commercial law is involved,'9 have naturally shown themselves 
restive under the rule imposed by the Supreme Court in the Northern 
Assurance Co. case. As might have been expected, the process of 
distinguishing away that case was soon under way, but this was rudely 
interrupted by the Supreme Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit had held20 that an insurance company which, with 
exact knowledge of the character of the risk gained through a report 
by its own inspector, had issued a fire policy and taken the insured's 
money as a premium therefor, was estopped to claim the benefit of the 
condition avoiding the policy in case other buildings were located within 
one hundred feet of the structure to be covered, a condition known by 
the insurer to be broken as soon as made. But by a writ of certiorari 
the Supreme Court brought the Circuit Court of Appeals roundly about, 
saying :21 "Therefore when by its written stipulation the document 
S It appears to be settled law in England that the soliciting agent who aids in the 
preparation of the application is deemed to be the agent of the insured and not of 
the insurer. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the insurer is held not to be 
estopped to take advantage of false answers inserted by the soliciting agent in the 
application form even when true answers have in fact been given by the insured 
to the agent. See Biggar v. Rock Life Assur. Co. [i902] i K. B. 506; Dawso 
V. Bonltin [1922, H. L.] 2 A. C. 413. Note, however, at p. 439, the dissenting 
opinion of Lord Wrenbury, who thinks that an estoppel should be found in such a 
case. The present state of the English authorities does not make it at all clear 
that the English courts would refuse to enforce an estoppel in pais if the acts upon 
which the alleged estoppel was based were done by one having authority to bind 
the insurer. Thus in Morrison v. Universal Marine Ins. Co. (1872) L. R. 8 
Exch. 40, at p. 53, Martin, B., makes the followving statement: "If the under- 
writer, after having acquired a knowledge of the facts of concealment, gives out 
a policy without notice and as if it were binding on him, he does that which would 
induce the assured to think that he had a valid policy and to seek no further for 
insurance. He cannot be allowed to wait until a loss has occurred and then elect 
to rescind when his own act has put the assured in a condition in which he can no 
longer insure himself anywhere." The judgment of the Court of Exchequer was 
reversed on appeal to the Exchequer Chamber (1873) L. R. 8 Exch. I97, not on 
the ground that no such estoppel could be shown, but rather because the evidence 
did not show all the elements of an estoppel. That is to say, the proof failed to 
show that the insured had in fact.relied to his prejudice upon the act of the 
insurer. See also Holdsworth v. Lanc. & York. Its. Co. (i9o7, K B.) 23 
T. L. RP 2i; Bower, Estoppel (1923) 373. 
Aebts Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, mspra note I; MacKelvie v. Mitt. Ben. Life Ins, 
Co. (I923, C. C. A. 2d) 287 Fed. 66o. 
'Rife v. Lumber Underwriters (19I3, C. C. A. 6th) 204 Fed. 32. The courts 
opinion makes no distinction between waiver and estoppel, using the terms inter- 
changeably. 
Lunmber Underwriters v. Rife, supra note 9, at p. 609, 35 Sup. Ct. 7I7. The 
Chief Justice and -justices McKenna and Day dissented, expressly approving the 
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gave notice that a certain term was insisted upon, it would be contrary 
to the fundamental theory of the legal relations established to allow 
parol proof that at the very moment when the policy was delivered 
that term was waived. It is the established doctrine of this court that 
such proof cannot be received." But even in the face of such a 
rebuke, the Circuit Courts of Appeal probably feel that there must be 
some limit to the application of the hard rule insisted upon by the 
Supreme Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
evidently considered that the limit had been passed when an insurance 
company, after refusing an application for insurance on a certain 
barge because its inspector reported it to be unseaworthy, subsequently 
granted the insurance at a much higher rate because of the unsea- 
worthiness, but thriftily included a warranty of seaworthiness in the 
policy issued. The judgment of the court that the insurer was 
estopped to set up a breach of this warranty appears to have remained 
undisturbed.22 
It is sufficiently unfortunate that as to these cases of true estoppels 
now under discussion there should be such a lack of harmony of deci- 
sion with regard to so important a question of commercial aw between 
the state and federal courts. But when we come to combine questions 
of waiver with those of estoppel, both being often complicated by 
difficult accompanying questions as to the powers of agents, we find 
a confusion of decision as well as of statement that is truly distress- 
ing.23 In this connection waivers and estoppels are sometimes care- 
fully distinguished as independent concepts24 and sometimes regarded 
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals. The failure of the court to make any 
distinction between a waiver, which certainly could not be shown under the circum- 
stances stated, and the estoppel found by the lower court, is remarkable. 
: "If the [insurer] knowingly took the risk at a higher prenilum it should be 
held to its bargain, and not be permitted to resort to the terms of the policy to 
overcome the claim," Amer. Marine Ins. Co. v. Ford Corp. (i920, C. C. A. zd) 
269 Fed. 768, 77o. See (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 763; also Hanover Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Dallavo (I921, C. C. A. 6th) 274 Fed. 258, where, however, a true 
waiver was involved. 
'As careful a judge as Lord Eldon uses the following language: "As to waiver, 
it is difficult to say precisely what is meant by the term with reference to the legal 
effect. A waiver is nothing unless it amounts to a release. It is by a release or 
something equivalent only that an equitable demand can be given away. A mere 
waiver signifies nothing more than an expression of intention not to insist upon 
the right, which in equity will not, without consideration, bar the right any more 
than, at law, accord without satisfaction would be a pled." Stackhouse v. Barnstom 
(i8o5, Ch.) io Ves. Jr. 453, 466. 
' See JohnsOn v. Aetna Ins. Co. (I905) i23 Ga. 404, 5I S. E. 339; Bemlis v. 
Casualty Co. (r9i4) i25 Minn. 54, 145 N. \W. 622; Redstrake v. Ciuoberland Mitt. 
Fire Ins. Co. (i882) 44 N. J. L. 294; Welch v. Fire Assoc. supra note x4. 
"Counsel's criticism of certain of the New York cases shows that he apparently 
fails to distinguish between a waiver and an estoppel." Fisk, J., in Leisen v. 
St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. supra note T4, at p. 335, I27 N. W. 845. "While that 
doctrine [,waiver] and the doctrine of equitable estoppel are often confused in 
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as complementary,25 but, unfortunately, most frequently the terms are 
treated as essentially synonymous.26 As an illustration of this prevail- 
ing confusion of thought and statement we may quote the following 
passage from a recent admirable treatise on insurance :27 "Any unequi- 
vocal and positive act by the insurers recognizing the policy as valid 
and inconsistent with the notion that the company proposes to avail 
itself of a breach.... constitutes a waiver of all known grounds of 
forfeiture, and the company is said to be estopped from setting them 
up in defense, provided the insured can show that by such act he has 
been misled to his injury." Not less confusing is the oft-quoted state- 
ment, made in Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wolff.28 What the 
court decided was that an alleged waiver fraudulently obtained from 
an unauthorized agent was not binding on the insurer, but what 
Mr. Justice Field, writing for the court, said was this: "The doctrine 
of waiver, as asserted against insurance companies to avoid the strict 
enforcement of conditions contained in their policies, is only another 
name f or the doctrine of estoppel. It can only be invoked where the con- 
duct of the companies has been such as to induce action in reliance 
upon it, and where it would operate as a fraud upon the assured if 
they were afterwards allowed to disavow their conduct and enforce 
the conditions." 
It is believed that much of this confusion in language and discord 
in decision can be removed by a careful analysis of the typical fact 
situations in insurance law to which the terms waiver and estoppel 
are applied, and discovering what is really meant when either or both 
terms are used. It will be found that however uncertain the meaning 
of the word waiver, and however many varying concepts it may 
insurance litigation, there is a clear distinction between the two." Culen, C. J., in 
Draper v. Oswego Co. F. R. Assoc. (igo7) i9o N. Y. i2, x6, 82 N. ED. 755, 756. 
See also the extended discussion in Craine v. Colonial Mitt. Fire Ins. Co. (192o, 
Austr.) 28 C. L. R. 305. 
25See Beinnett v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (I903) 203 Ill. 439, 67 N. E. 971; 
Robinson v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co. (i897) 90 Me. 385, 38 Atl. 320; N. Y. Life It's. 
Co. V. Eggleston (1877) 96 U. S. 572. 
"Northern Assutr. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Assoc. sutra note I; .Iverson V. 
Met. Life Ins. Co. supra note Is; Wisdoin v. Farm Prop. Mut. Ils. Assoc. (x925, 
Iowa) 2o2 N. W. 5; Oatmnan v. Bankers' Mait. F. R. Assoc. ('9QI) 66 Or. 388, 
xz3 Pac. 1033. 
"The doctrine of waiver, as applied to such a case as this, is that of estoppel 
in pais. There is no substantial distinction between the two, and the terms are 
used interchangeably, a waiver being only another name for an estoppel." Cart- 
wright, J., in Phentix Ins. Co. v. Grove (1905) 215 I1L 299, 302, 74 N. E. 141, 142. 
In the valuable note in I6 L. R .A. (N. s.) 1i65, is found at p. 12I8, the following 
statement: "In many of the cases the knowledge of the agent, instead of being 
held to estop the company, is held to amount to a waiver. The distinction, how- 
ever, as applied to insurance cases, does not seem to be of importance, since the 
terms appear to be used as synonymous." 
Richards, Insurance (3d ed. i9i6) M71. 
(I877) 95 U. S. 326, 333. 
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include,29 it is nevertheless a useful term, connoting a group of legal 
relationships that have many incidents in common, and which, in the 
vast majority of cases, are easily distiguishable from estoppels, 
although here, as elsewhere in the law, we find borderland cases which 
present facts that may be interpreted as raising the one or the other 
as the emphasis is shifted.30 
WAIVERS 
First considering the typical fact situations to which courts and 
text-writers most frequently apply the term waiver, we will assume 
that in all cases the agent acting for the insurance company is empow- 
ered to bind it by word or act. Such in fact is often not the case, but 
for our present purposes it is desirable to exclude the complicating 
questions introduced by limitations upon the powers of agents. These 
will be considered only incidentally. 
Case (i). Jones informs the agent of the insurer that he will not 
apply for life insurance since he is about to enter military service, 
which he knows is contrary to a condition in the policy proposed. 
The agent replies that his company is one hundred per cent. patriotic 
and will not enforce that condition. Jones thereupon makes appli- 
cation and duly receives a policy in which is written a condition that 
it shall become void if the insured engages in military service without 
the consent of the company endorsed thereon. Jones thereafter, 
without such endorsed consent, enlists in the army and is killed in 
France. In an action on this policy Jones' administrator seeks to 
avoid the insurer's defense of breach of condition by offering evidence 
that it was waived before the making of the contract. 
Here we clearly have an attempt to show a preliminary parol agree- 
ment which was not incorporated in the subsequent written contract, 
and therefore was "merged" in it. Such a preliminary agreement, 
whether written or parol, cannot be shown in contradiction of the 
policy.3' The so-called "parol testimony rule" based on common sense, 
and so essential to the integrity of business engagements, cannot be 
evaded merely by calling the preliminary agreement a waiver or even 
In 2 Williston, Contracts (i920) sec. 679, are listed no fewer than nine legal 
relationships to which the term waiver is indifferently applied. 
' For example, in many cases denial of all liability under the policy is held to 
estop the insurer from claiming as a defense the failure of the insured to furnish 
proofs of loss as required by the policy. See Robinson v. Pemt. Fire Ills. Co. smqpra 
note 25; Butterworth v. West. Ins. Co. (I882) i32 Mass. 489. Such conduct 
may easily be interpreted as a waiver. See cases cited in note 43, infra. 
" Insurance Co. v. Mfowry (i877) 96 U. S. 544; Penman v. St. Patil In-s. Co. 
(i910) 2i6 U. S. 3XI, 30 Sup. Ct. dIx; Homze Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilson (I93) I09 
Ark. 324, I59 S. W. III3; Calmenson v. Insurawe Co. (X904) 92 Minn. 390, I00 
N. W. i88; ULhion Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Hook (igoo) 62 Ohio St. 256, 56 N. E. 
9o6; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Hall (i9Os) 104 Va. 572, 52 S. E. 345. 
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an estoppel. The few decisions that have allowed such a "waiver" to 
be set up as an estoppel are much to be regretted.3 
Case (2). A life policy having been tendered to Jones according 
to his application, he reads it and discovers the condition with regard 
to military service, and refuses to accept it. Thereupon the agent 
says, "We will waive that clause." Satisfied with this assurance, Jones 
accepts the policy and enlists. 
Here also is a parol agreement inconsistent with the terms of the 
written contract, made contemporaneously with its delivery, and also 
"merged" in it. The same considerations as in the preceding case 
preclude its being shown in an action at law. 
Case (3). Jones, having an existing policy containing the anti- 
military condition, informs the agent of his desire to enlist and asks a 
waiver of the condition. The agent replies: "Certainly. We wilt 
not enforce that condition. It is waived." Acting on such promise, 
Jones enlists. 
Here again we have an agreement made upon adequate considera- 
tion, being a promise for an act impliedly requested, operating to 
modify the existing written agreement. There is no reason whatever 
why a written policy contract shall not be subsequently modified by 
parol agreement. The courts uniformly admit evidence of such sub- 
sequent parol "waivers."33 The question usually litigated is not the 
admissibility of the evidence, but the authority of the agent to make 
the modifying agreement or waiver.34 
Case (4). Jones, having such a policy, serves in the army without 
injury and is discharged. He informs the agent of these facts, and 
tenders the next accruing premium. The agent accepts the premium 
saying that while the policy had been forfeited the company will 
waive the forfeiture. 
Here we have an agreement on valuable consideration-the payment 
of the premium,-but it is not made in modification of the policy con- 
tract, which still remains unchanged, including the anti-military clause. 
It accomplishes merely the relinquishment of the insurer's privilege to 
set up an otherwise perfectly valid defense to any action on the policy. 
This may very properly be called a waiver. It will be enforced by all 
Sovereign Camp v. Richardson (i921) I5i Ark. 231, 236 S. W. 778. See also 
Pfiester v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co. (I91i) 85' Kan. 97, ii6 Pac. 245. "However 
keen the disappointment of the insured may have been, nevertheless he was neither 
deceived nor misled." (1922) 3I YALE LAW JOURNAL, 778. 
Ilits. Co. v. Norton (i877) 96 U. S. z34; Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Unsell 
(1892) 144 U. S. 439, I2 SUP. Ct. 67i; Amner. Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lu~mber Co. 
(1919) 250 U. S. 2, 39 SUP. Ct. 431u; Hastings v. B'klyn. Life Ins. Co. (I893) 
I38 N. Y. 473, 34 N. E. 289; Graham v. Sec. Mut, Life Ins. Co. 1905) 72 N. J. L. 
298, 6z Atl. 68i; Holdswarth v. Lanc. & York. Ins. Co. sunpra note 18; Wing v. 
Harvey (i854, Chl) 5 DeG. M. & G. 265; 2 Cooley, op. cit. 2658 et seq.; i6 
L. R. A. (X. s.) 117I, note. 
'4 See Peterson v. Modern Woodmnen (1923) i27 Wash. 4I2, 220 Pac. 809. 
Obviously such a waiver by an agent not authorized to make it, should not be 
binding upon the insurer. Baonmgartel v. Prov. Wash. Ins. Co. (i893) I36 N. Y. 
547, 32 N. E. 99o; Met. Life Tns. Co. v. Hall sztpra note 31. 
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courts, whether the waiver be express, or only implied from acceptance 
of the premium by the insurer with knowledge of the breach of 
condition.35 
Case (5). Jones secures a fire policy which by its terms is "void" 
in its inception because he has other insurance on the building covered. 
Subsequently the insurer, being informed of the breach of condition, 
expressly excuses it and accepts payment of a deferred premium. 
Here we have what may be termed a subsequent waiver of a breach 
of condition precedent to the inception of the contract, which all 
courts agree may be shown by parol.S3 If it were true that the con- 
tract had no inception until the waiver, we should here have a parol 
waiver contemporaneous with the making of the contract, which would 
be subject to the same objections as in Case (2) stated above. But in 
fact the contract does have its inception with delivery to the insured, 
though it is voidable at the option of the insurer, not of the insured ;3 
that is, the insurer has the power to avoid the entire contract if he so 
elects. It is this power which he subsequently waives. Such a waiver 
cannot be obnoxious to the parol testimony rule. 
Case (6). Jones, having a life policy containing the anti-military 
clause, enlists without the consent of the insurer, but is shortly after- 
wards discharged with health unimpaired. The agent of the insurer 
thereupon writes him a letter stating that the company takes pleasure in 
reinstating his forfeited policy. Jones then dies before paying another 
premium, or doing any other act in reliance upon the letter of rein- 
'Phoenix Mitt. Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin (1887) 120 U. S. 183, 7 Sup. Ct. 500; 
Hennessyl v. Met. Life I=s. Co. (igea) 74 Cown. 699, 52 Ad. 490; Gefemani Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Koehler (i893) i68 Ill. 293, 48 N. E. 297; Monahan v. Malt. Life I's. 
Co. (Igo6) 103 Md. i45, 63 Ad. 2II; McNicholas v. Prudential Is. Co. (,907) 
xg6 Mass. 565, 82 N. E 692. Some courts seem to regard a waiver supported by 
consideration (payment of an unearned premium) as the making of a new contract. 
See Latza v. Vermont Ins. Co. (i8gi) 139 Pa. 546, 21 Atl. 8o. But the insurer 
does not waive a breach of condition by receiving or enforcing payment of a 
premium already earned before such breach. Burner v. German-Alnericam In4s. 
Co. (898) I03 Ky. 370, 45 S. W. I@9; Lesseps v. Fidelity Mitt. Life Ins. Co. 
(igoS) mo LA 6IO, 45 Sn. 522. 
" Phoenix Mist. Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin, supra note 35; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Dallavo, supra note 22 (mere retention of unearned premiums) ; Masonic Life Inzs. 
Co. v. Robinson (19i2) I49 Ky. 8o, I47 S. W. 882; Wood v. Amer. Fire Inls. Co. 
(I896) i49 N. Y. 382, 44 N. E. So; Armnstrong v. Thrqtuand (I858, C. P.) g Ir. 
C. L. 32; Morrison v. Untiversal Marine Ins. Co. supra note i8. Cf. Marine Ins. 
Act (Igo6) 6 Edw. VII, c. 4I, sec. 34 (3). "A breach of warranty may be 
Avaived by the insurer." 
"See cases cited in notes 74-78 infra. It is sometimes declared, however, that 
upon breach of condition the policy in suit became ipso facto void, and could be 
revived only by a new contract supported by a "consideration or an estoppel.) 
See New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. Watson (I87I) 23 Mich. 486; Carpenter v. Cott. 
Its. Co. (i886) 6i Mich. 635, 28 N. W. 749; New v. German Ins. Co. (i892) 5 
Ind. App. 82, 3i N. E. 475 (alienation by insured); Behling v. N. W. Nat. Life 
I's. Co. (I903) II7 Wis. 24, 93 N. W.'800 (failure to pay premium note). No 
case is known to the writer in which such a declaration was really necessary to 
the decision. See comment on such statements in Ewart, Waiver Distrihuted 
(1917) 50, SI. 
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written contract, and not to recitals, has no application whatever. The 
statement. The insurer has extinguished his privilege to set up the 
breach of condition.38 
Case (7). Jones, having an existing life policy, enlists contrary to 
the condition therein, and is killed in France. The insurer writes to 
the widow-beneficiary: "Your husband's policy was forfeited by his 
entering military service, but since he died for his country, we have 
decided to pay the full amount of the policy." Later the insurer 
refuses to pay. It seems that such a waiver, though without the sup- 
port of any consideration, is sufficient to extinguish the insurer's privi- 
lege to set up the breach of condition.3 
Case (8). Jones' accident policy contains a provision excepting 
from the risks covered by the contract death or injury suffered on 
account of riding in an aeroplane. Jones is killed while engaged in 
aviation, but the sympathetic insurer, with full knowledge of the facts, 
agrees to waive the exception. Such a waiver is not binding unless 
supported by a consideration.4" 
Case (9). The insurance company's agent tenders to Jones a life 
policy containing a stipulation that it shall not take effect until actually 
delivered to the insured while he is in good health, and the first premium 
is actually paid in cash. Jones explains that he has not the ready 
money, and offers to give his note at three months for the premium. 
The agent accepts the note and delivers the policy. Jones dies within 
the three months. Is the insurer under a duty to pay? 
At first it seems that we have a situation similar to that in Case No. 2, 
involving an agreement contemporaneous with the making of the written 
contract and contradicting one of its terms, and so not to be shown. 
But such is not the case. The condition requiring prepayment of 
the first premium is not a contractual term. It is merely the recital of 
the condition imposed on the insurer's offer of the promise written 
in the policy; limiting the manner of acceptance. Ordinarily the 
insured's application is regarded as the offer, and the issuance of the 
policy as the acceptance of that offer. But here the insurer puts a 
condition on his acceptance-prepayment of the first premium-which 
turns it into a counter offer<1 Thus the tender of the policy is an 
offer conditioned upon acceptance in a specified manner, that is by 
prepayment of the first premium in cash. If the offerer wishes to 
remove this condition, or otherwise modify the mode of acceptance 
prescribed in the offer, there can be no objection to his doing so. The 
parol testimony rule, which applies only to promissory provisions of a 
s Wylie v. Jeffersons Standard Life Ins. Co. (I913) 95 S. C. i63, 78 S. E. 745. 
' Hone Fire Ins. Co. v. Khihlnian (1899) 58 Neb. 488, 78 N. W. 936; and see 
Bowmnian v. Surety Fund Life Ies. Co. (ig2i) i49 Minn. iI8, 182 N. W. ggI. 
' See cases cited in note 54, infra. 
' This process is clearly shown in McKelvie v. Mitt. Ben. Life Ins. Co. s:4pra 
note x9. 
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insurer is here said to waive the condition of prepayment contained in 
the policy. What he really does is to modify the condition imposed 
upon the policy offer. The question involves the maling of the con- 
tract, not the operation of a contract already made. The cases rightly 
hold that the insurer may "waive" this condition, and that such waiver 
may be shown by parol.42 
Case (io). Jones' fire policy contains a provision that no action 
shall be brought thereon unless satisfactory proofs of loss are furnished 
within sixty days after the fire. Immediately after a fire Jones applies 
for forms on which to make his proofs of loss, but is told by the insurer 
that such proofs are not required, all liability under the policy being 
denied because of breach of the condition against other insurance. 
Almost without dissent the courts hold that such denial of liability is 
a "waiver" of the insurer's privilege to require proofs of loss.43 
Case (ii). Jones' fire policy gives to the insurer in case of loss 
the option to repair or rebuild instead of paying money compensation. 
The insurer, having by words or acts led the insured to believe that 
it will pay a loss in money, is said to have waived, or to be estopped 
from claiming, its option to rebuild, at least when the insured has acted 
upon the induced belief." Here it is obvious that the policy gives 
the insurer the privilege of electing between two alternative modes of 
performance, paying or rebuilding. This privilege once exercised, by 
electing the one or the other, is thereby extinguished. Although this 
is a typical example of "election," there is no serious objection to the 
statement that by electing one alternative the insurer waives his privii- 
lege to elect the other.45 
It is to be noted that while in all of the instances set out above, the 
waivers are expressly declared by words, they differ from similar 
' A delivery of the policy without prepayment by an authorized agent with intent 
to make the contract presently operative "waives" the prepayment. Mut. Reserve 
Life Ins. Co. v. Heidel (i9o8, C. C. A. 8th) r6r Fed. 535. See I7 L. R. A. 
(N. s.) 1149, note; Roberts v. Security Co. [i897] I Q. B. iii. But not so if 
there is no such intent. McKelvie v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. supra note ig; nor 
if delivery is by an agent without authority to "waive" such condition. Drilling 
v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1922) 234 N. Y. 234, I37 N. E. 314. 
" Royal Ins. Co. v. Martin (i904) 192 U. S. i49, 4 Sup. Ct. 27; Feis v. United 
States firs. Co. (X924, Neb.) 20i N. W. 558; Radwanaski v. Scottish U. & Nat. 
Ins. Co. (i94, N. J. Sup. Ct.) i26 Ad. 657; Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis (i9iq) 
76 OkIa. i42, i83 .Pac. 975. 
4See note 52, infra. 
Mr. Ewart, in his amusing book 'Waiver Distributed," fiercely objects to the 
use of "waiver" in connection with, or, as he thinks, in place of, election. See 
Ewart, op. cit. supra note 37, 25. "If you had a choice between a horse and a 
mule, and you chose the horse, you would not say that you 'waived' the mule. 
For you did not. You had an election between two animals, and, electing to take 
one, you could do nothing with reference to the other." Ibid. 7. If Mr. Ewart 
should elect to take the mule, one might accurately enough say he had waived his 
privilege to take the horse. 
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waivers implied from the acts of the parties only in the manner of 
proof. There may well be great differences of opinion as to whether 
or not a waiver may be implied from a given state of facts-as for 
instance, whether retention of an unearned premium after the insurer 
has learned of a breach of condition justifies the implication of a 
waiver of such breach46- and the conflict of testimony submitted to a 
jury may render the result highly uncertain, yet "implied waivers," when 
once the implication has been made, are not different from express 
waivers. The fact, however, that implied waivers are established by 
proof of conduct by the insurer justifying the insured in inferring 
that he intends to waive, and of conduct by the insured showing that 
he has in fact drawn such an inference, it is easy to say that when the 
insured has been misled by the conduct of the insurer, the latter is 
estopped to deny the truth of such inference. As a consequence, we 
find the extensive practice of confusing implied waivers and estoppels 
and regarding the terms as interchangeable.47 This is most misleading. 
If the eleven typical fact situations set out above are carefully con- 
sidered, it will be observed that while all the legal relationships created 
exhibit a common character in that insurer in each expresses an inten- 
tion to relinquish a privilege accorded him under fue terms of the 
contract as written, so that all come roughly under the generally 
accepted definition of a waiver, "an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right"48-yet differentiating legal relations cast them into 
several quite distinct classes, which for convenience we will designate 
(I) substitute agreements, (II) proper waivers, (III) assumption of 
excepted risk, (IV) removal of condition upon acceptance, (V) denial 
of liability, (VI) election. These we will consider separately. 
I. Substitute Agreemnents. In each of the first three cases there is 
an attempt to show an agreement, possessing all the requisites of a 
contract, that is, offer, acceptance and consideration, as a substitute 
for an inconsistent term of the written contract. Evidence is offered 
for the purpose of changing the terms of the contract as written and' 
delivered. In each case the plaintiff wishes to show that, contrary to 
the terms of the written contract, the parties really agreed that the 
insurer's conditional duty to pay should remain unaffected by Jones' 
entry into military service. As to Case (3), where the modifying 
agreement, being a promise for an act contemplated and impliedly 
requested, was subsequent to the delivery of the policy, there is no 
reason whatever to exclude the proof offered. The law permits the 
parties to a simple contract in writing to alter its terms by a subsequent 
' See Parsons v. Lae (1906) 97 Minn. 98, xo6 N. W. 485; 2 Wiffiston, op. cit. 
sec. 757. 
47 See Richards, op. cit. siepra note 27, i5q; An ver. Dig. tit. Insurance, secs. 388, 
et seq.; Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co. (1920) 209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W. 242. 
'8Fed. Land Bank v. Atlas Assur. Co. (i924, N. C.) i25 S. E. 63I; Adams v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (i9n2) i93 Iowa, Io07, i88 N. W. 823. See Ewart, 
op. cit. 6. 
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parol agreement ;49 and in modern times the same rule is applied to a 
contract under seal if the modifying agreement has been acted on.30 
But Cases (i) and (2) are different There Jones, after or at the 
time of making his parol agreement, accepts a writing known to be a 
memorial of the contract and flatly to contradict such agreement.. If 
such an inconsistent parol agreement could be shown under these 
circumstances, the certainty in contract legal relations so essential to 
the conduct of business, would be impossible.' Therefore the law pro- 
hibits it this prohibition being expressed in terms of the famous and 
much lauded parol evidence rule. We conclude, then, without any 
serious difficulty, that these three "waivers" are but modifying con- 
tracts, two of which are inoperative to change the legal relations of 
the parties while the third is fully effective. 
II. Proper Waivers. The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh cases 
form a second group to which the term waiver is applied in quite a 
different sense. In none of the cases of this group is there any inten- 
tion to change a term of the policy but in each the insurer has expressed 
an intention not to assert an otherwise perfectly good existing defense, 
and has expressly or impliedly promised not to do so. In the first two 
cases of the group this promise or "waiver" rests upon a consideration, 
the payment of a premium not otherwise due, but in the other two no 
consideration for the promise can be found. Hence we may say that 
the waiver in the first two of these cases operates as a kind of release 
of a privilege of defense, but the waiver in the other two cases cannot 
be so described, as a release not under seal is inoperative in the absence 
of a considerations Therefore this second group of cases may be 
called proper waivers, since there is no other term that is adequately 
descriptive. As to the two cases in which no consideration for the 
waiver is found, the term is fairly distinctive. One writer vehemently 
asserts that even here there is no proper use for the word waiver; that 
the insurer has his election in such cases to remain bound or to 
renounce his obligation, and that when he elects one of these alterna- 
tives he is bound by his election, and that is all there is to it. "The 
case is purely one of election. The default has not only not caused 
forfeiture of the policy, but has not in the least affected it. The 
contract remains as it was until election is made to cancel it. Then it 
is at an end."52 
4"An insurance policy, no matter what by-laws are incorporated in it by 
reference, is but the written expression of a contract, which the 'parties themselves 
(not being under legal disability or prohibition) may modify by mutual consent 
This is the legal basis of most so-called 'waivers' of conditions in insurance 
policies." Perrigo v. Coun. Comnmn. Trav. Muit. Acc. Assoc. (1925, Conn.) x27 
AtL IO, 13, overruding Coughlin v. Knights of Columbus (igo6) 79 Conn. 28, 64 
AtI. 223. To the same effect is Crowley v. A: 0. H. W. & 0. Fund (I5)2) 
Mass. 228, iio N. E. 276. 
G See 2 Williston, op. cit. sec. 69o. 
'134 Cyc. i048. See Fed. Land Bank v. Atlas Assur. Co. supra note 48. 0 Ewart, op. cit. 25. 
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The author is undoubtedly supported by the overwhelming weight 
of judicial opinion in saying that the insured's default has not caused 
forfeiture of the policy, meaning thereby the extinguishment of the 
legal relations of the parties created by the making of the policy; but 
he is mistaken in asserting that such default "has not in the least 
affected" those relations.53 The breach of condition has created a 
most important power-liability relation between the insurer and the 
insured. That is, the insurer now has the power and privilege to 
rescind the contract as of the time of the breach, and the insured is 
under a liability of losing his rights under the policy by the insurer's 
exercise of his power. This power to extinguish his own duties under 
the contract, as well as the insured's rights, the law permits the insurer 
to relinquish or "waive" by merely indicating by words or acts that he 
so intends. And the courts are so willing to discover an intention to 
waive this destructive power that, as will presently appear, they often 
find sufficient evidence of it in mere silence and inaction on the part 
of the insurer for an unreasonable time after knowledge of the insured's 
default. But however that may be, it seems clear that the term 
"twaiver" more adequately describes what really takes place than does 
the word "election," for the insurer's only election is between exercising 
his power of rescission and waiving it. 
III. Assumption of Excepted Risk. In case (8) it is obvious that 
the insurer never assumed any duty to pay for the loss suffered by 
reason of the excepted risk. There is no intention to change any term 
of the policy or to "waive" any breach of condition. No condition is 
broken. The original contract remains unchanged. It simply does 
not cover this particular loss. The alleged waiver is merely a new 
and independent promise to pay money, unenforceable unless sealed 
or supported by a consideration.5" It would be just as reasonable to 
say that the insurer's unsupported promise to pay for a loss occurring 
after the expiration of a fire policy is enforceable as to declare that 
'Professor Williston in very different words expresses much the same idea 
when he says: "The insurer, when taking advantage of a breach of condition, is 
'not seeking to rescind the contract sued upon: it is standing upon the contract, 
and insisting that under its terms there is no liability.' 2 Williston, op. cit. sec. 
746, p. i42i, citing Goorberg v. West. Assur. Co. (i907) i5o Calif. 5IO, 5I8, 89 
Pac. 130. It is submitted that the insurer, by asserting either on the court record 
or ins pais, that he will not pay because of breach of condition, thereby extinguishes 
not only his own duty to pay, but also any rights he may claim under the policy 
as an executory contract. 
'Steil v. Suit Ins. Office (i916) I7I Calif. 795, 155 Pac. 72; Knights, etc. v. 
Shoaf (i906) i66 Ind. 367, 77 N. E. 738; Ridgeway v. Modern Woodsmen (09i6) 
98 Kan. 240, I57 Pac. I9i; Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co. supra note 47; 
Bomwan v. Sucrety Fund Life Ins. Co. supra note 39; Hencrickson v. Grand Lodge 
(19I2) 120 Minn. 36, 138 N. W. 946; Draper v. Oswego Co. F. R. Asst. (i907) 
i90 N. Y. i2, 82 N. E. 755; McCoy v. N. W. Life Ins. Co. (I896) 9a Wis. 577, 
66 N. W. 697. 
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the insurer's "waiver" of an exception is binding without con- 
sideration.55 
IV. Removal of Condition upon Acceptance. The offeror may 
dictate the mode of the acceptance which is to complete the contract, 
and to that end may impose such conditions as he sees fit on the manner 
in which his offer is to be accepted. If he wishes he may stipulate 
that the acceptance of an offer of a promise to insure shall not be 
complete until the first premium is paid, and if he insists on this con- 
dition, no other mode of acceptance will complete the contract. On the 
other hand, since the condition is entirely within the insurer's control 
he may relinquish or "waive" the condition whenever he will. No 
promise or other term of a contract is involved, for no contract has 
yet been made. The insurer merely gives up the privilege of insist- 
ing upon a given mode of acceptance. For such a waiver it is manifest 
that no consideration is required.56 
V. Denial of Liability. When the insurer denies any liability 
whatever under the contract, as in case (Io), the courts generally say 
that all conditions still to be performed by the insured are waived.57 
Here the term "waiver" is used to describe the operation of that long 
settled rule of law and good sense that when one party to a contract 
has made the performance of conditions required of the other either 
impossible or unnecessary, the latter is excused from performances. 
Such a waiver has little in common with the others under discussion, 
unless it be considered that the insurer by his repudiation of the con- 
tract intends, as he expressly declares in the case put, to give up his 
privilege of requiring performance of the condition.59 In such cases 
a consideration for the "waiver" may usually be found in the insured's 
detrimental inaction induced by the insurer's repudiation, but the 
excuse for the insured's failure to perform is sufficiently clear under 
the general rule stated above, and there is no need to invoke the 
doctrine of waiver or to seek a consideration. 
VI. Election. The policy may give to the insurer the privilege of 
electing between two alternative duties, such as payment or replace- 
ment in case of property loss, as stated in case ( i i ). Here it is usually 
said that by electing to do either one the insurer "waives his right" to 
" See 2 Williston, Op. cit. sec. 763; Harper v. Mich. Mitt. etc. Itns. Co. (1912) 
I73 Mich. 459, 139 N. W. 27. But where in settlement of a disputed claim, the 
insurer promises to pay a certain sum, he is liable on such compromise agreement, 
even though the policy does not in fact cover the loss suffered. The recovery is 
not on the policy, but on the compromise agreement. Dobbs v. New Ailsterda,7, 
Casualty Co. (i925, N. J. Ct. Err.) i27 At]. 209. 
' See cases cited in note 42, suipra. 
" See cases cited in note 43, silpra. 
C' See Williston, op. cit. sec. 677. 
' Such an expression is, however, meaningless, since the insurer, by his very act 
of repudiation, extinguishes all his privileges to demand performance on the part 
of the insured. 
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do the other.60 It would, perhaps, be more accurate to say that the 
insurer has reserved to himself the privilege of electing between two 
alternative duties, and also the power, by expressing his election to 
fix the right of the insured and his own duty, and likewise to extinguish 
his own privilege of election. Such a relinquishment of a privilege 
of election may very properly be called a waiver, evidently very similar 
to those in Class II above. 
ARE WAIVERS BINDING WITHOUT CONSIDERATION? 
The classification of waivers given above, which could probably be 
easily extended, shows with sufficient clearness that this elusive term 
is applied to so many differing legal relationships that the statement 
of any rule as governing waivers in general is apt to be inaccurate and 
misleading. This is strikingly illustrated by the statements to be 
found in the cases with regard to the need of a consideration to support 
a waiver. The statement most frequently found is that a waiver is 
not binding unless supported by consideration or an estoppel.6' By 
estoppel here is meant the "promissory estoppel" of the text writers,62 
that is, prejudicial action in reliance upon the waiver, which usually 
is found to be such action as was expressly or impliedly requested, 
or anticipated by the insurer as a consequence of his promise to waive. 
Scarcely less frequently it is declared that no consideration is necessary 
to support a waiver. Cases may often be found in the same juris- 
diction declaring now the one rule and now the other.64 
Wykoop v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (i883) 91 N. Y. 478. -Such waiver is 
irrevocable. Phila. Fire Assoc. v. Rosenthal (i885) io8 Pa. 474, I Atl. 303; 
Langan v. Aetna Ins. Co. (igoo, C. C. N. D. Iowa) 9g Fed. 374. After election 
by insurer to rebuild, the insured's action is for the breach of a contract to rebuild, 
and the measure of damages is not limited to the face of the policy. Heimnwz v. 
Westchester Fire Ins. Ca. (i878) 75 N. Y. 7. The replacement clause in the fire 
policy is sometimes construed to create in the insurer not an alternative conditional 
duty, but a power by rebuilding to extinguish the duty to pay money indemnity. 
Hence it is held that a mere "election" to rebuild does not terminate the insured's 
right to demand indemnity, which may be enforced if the insurer fails to act on 
his election by rebuilding. See Gage v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. (igiz) 3 Okla. 744, 
I27 Pac. 407. See 2o L. R. A. (N. s.) 960, note. 
'Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Pnrett (1883) 74 Ala. 487; Bronson v. N. W. Mat. 
Life Ins. Ca. (IgzI) 75 Ind. App. 39, i29 N. E. 636; Swedish Aner. Ins. Co. v. 
Knutson (I903) 67 Kan. 7r, 72 Pac. 526;. Fed. Land Bank v. Atlas Assur. Co. 
supra note 48; Gibson Elec. Co. v. Liverpool, L. & G. Ins. Co. (I8gg) i59 N. Y. 
418, 54 N. E. 23. See cases cited in Richards, op. cit. I59, i6o; i & 2 Williston, 
op. cit. secs. 203, 679; Phillips, Insurance (5th ed. i867) 8, 9; Cooley, op. cit. 2470. 
See Williston, op. cit. secs. I39, 679 (3). 
a Washburn v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (i194) I43 Ala. 485, 38 So. IOII; 
Knarston v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (i903) I40 Calif. 57, 73 Pac. 740; Phenix 
Ins. Co. v. Grove (I905) 215 111. 299, 74 N. E. I4I; Viele v. Germania Ins. Co. 
(i868) 26 Iowa, 9; Titus v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. (i88o) 8i N. Y. 4IO; Mee v. 
Bankers' Life Assoc. (i897) 69 Minn. 210, 72 N. W. 74. 
Compare the statement in Draper v. Oswego Co. F. R. Assoc. st~pra note 54, 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.99 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 18:13:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL 85I 
The reason for such confusion of statement is not far to seek. When 
the waiver involved is really a substituted agreement, falling in Class I 
above, it is of course inoperative without a consideration.05 The same 
thing is true of so-called waivers of exceptions (Class III above)."" 
No duty- can be created de novo by a naked promise though it be 
called a waiver. In such cases we might expect the courts to say that 
a waiver must have the support of a consideration. 
On the other hand it is equally clear that the waiver of a condition 
affecting the acceptance of an offer (Class IV), if made by the offerer 
who imposed it, needs no consideration, since the only question 
involved is the intention of the parties to be bound. Neither does 
waiver by election (Class VI), nor waiver by denial of liability 
(Class V), even though in such case a consideration of detriment is 
usually present. We may naturally expect to find in such cases the 
statement that waivers require no consideration. 
It is in cases involving "proper waivers" (Class II) that serious 
difficulty is encountered. In cases (4) and (5) a consideration is 
clearly present, but none exists in cases (6) and (7). Are these latter 
waivers binding on the insurer? If the language of the policy declar- 
ing the contract null and void in case of breach of the condition is 
taken literally, manifestly all the duties as well as the rights of both 
parties to the contract were extinguished by such breach, and a duty 
to pay could not be created de novo by a naked promise.87 But these 
provisions are not so interpreted. They mean merely that the contract 
becomes voidable at the option of the insurer,68 but remains fully 
that "It requires no consideration for a waiver, nor any prejudice or injury to the 
other party," with the opinion in Gibson, Elec. Co. v. Liverpool L. & G. Ins. Co., 
spqra note 6i. 
'N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dimloer (i922, C. C. A. 5th) 282 Fed. 969; Patterson v. 
Amer. Ints. Co. (i9i2) x64 Mo. App. i57, 148 S. W. 48. 
e See cases cited supra in note 5. 
"Ruock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co. supra note 47; Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Berry- 
anon (I12I) x93 Ky. 7, 234 S. W. 748. See 2 Williston, op. cit. sec. 63; Anson, 
Contracts (Corbin's ed. i9A9) sec. 365. "It is undoubedly true that where an 
insurance company is, for any cause, discharged from liability, responsibility for 
the loss will not re-attach by waiver without proof of the authority in the party 
whose act of waiver is relied upon, or without a new consideration to sustain it." 
Inperial Fire Its. Co. v. Dunhamlu (i88S) II7 Pa. 460, 473, I2 Atl. 668, 673. Se 
28 A. L. R. 93, note. And if the contract was really void in its inception because 
of want of insurable interest, rendering it illegal, no waiver, though expressed in an 
incontestable clause, can make it valid. See Anstil v. Mfrs'. Life Ilns. Co. [i899, 
H. L.] A. C. 6o4; Bromley v. Wash. Life Ins. Co. (igo6) i22 Ky. 402. 92 S. W. 
17; Clement v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (i898) iom Tenn. 22, 46 S. W. 56i. 
' Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Michael (igo6) i67 Ind. 659, 79 N. EM go5; Stiegler v. 
Eureka Life Ins. Co. (9ab5, Md.) i27 Atl. 397. Statements may occasionally be, 
found to the effect that when a condition expressly (or by interpretation) declares 
that breach shall render the contract void without further action on the part of 
the insured, such condition is "self-executing," and the contract cannot be vitalized 
except to "recreation." See notes in 25 L. R A. (N. s.) i, i6, 20, 78; Kennedy v. 
Grand Fraternity (1907) 36 Mont. 325, 92 Pac. 971. 
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binding on the insured in so far as he may have made promises.69 
The peculiarity of the inisurance contract, however, is that it seldom 
imposes duties on the insured, but gives him privileges and powers in 
the form of conditions. 
Breach of condition, then, by the insured does not avoid the contract, 
but gives to the insurer the power to avoid it if he chooses. If he 
exercises this power and does avoid the contract, he extinguishes all 
legal relations created by it, and his duty to pay cannot thereafter be 
recreated without a new contract.70 But if he fails to exercise his power 
to avoid, and, with full knowledge of the breach of condition, remains 
silent and inactive, what then are the legal relations of the parties? 
Obviously any duties imposed by the contract upon the insured remain 
unchanged until the insurer sees fit to exercise his power to avoid. 
The correlative rights of the insurer likewise must continue. But 
what has happened to the insurer's duty to pay in case of loss? Has it 
been extinguished, or does it still exist subject, however, to a power in 
the insurer to extinguish it by doing a certain act, that is, expressing an 
intention to disaffirm, or "avoid," the whole contract? 
It is argued with much force that since the insurer has a complete 
defense to any action brought to enforce his promise, he cannot be 
under any existing duty;"" and that the pleading of the breach of 
condition as an affirmative defense72 is not to be regarded as an 
operative fact, the exercise of a power to defeat an existing duty, but 
merely as a statement necessary to bring the operative facts to the 
attention of the court. But it is difficult to reconcile this theory of 
the relationship with the cases involving insurance contracts. In 
increasing numbers the courts are holding that on breach of condition 
subsequent the insurer has but a power to disaffirm the entire contract, 
and that this power must be affirmatively exercised within a reason- 
able time after notice or be regarded as waived.73 The policy may 
Germcmtia In>s. Co. v. Kiewer (i889) I29 Ill. 599, 22 N. . 489. 
t?Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kuhlman supra note 39; Ewart, op. cit. xOI. 
See N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Stathamt (i876) 93 U. S'. 24; Banholzer v. N. Y. 
Life Ins. Co. (i898) 74 Minn. 387, 77 N. W. 295, 78 N. W. 244. 
' See Richards, op. cit. I55. In some jurisdictions it is held that plaintiff must 
plead and prove performance of conditions precedent to the inception of the policy. 
See Benanti v. Del. Ins. Co. (i912) 86 Conn. I5, 84 AtI. iog. 
'Kelley v. Ins. Co. (1914) 262 IlI. 158, 104 N. E. i88; Modern Woodrnetn v. 
Vincent (907) 40 Ind. App. 7II, So N. E. 427, 82 N. E. 475; Swedish-Amnrican 
Ins. Co. v. Knutson, supra note 6i; Phoenix Ilns. Co. v. Spiers (I888) 87 Ky. 285, 
8 S. W. 453; Phenix Ins. Co. v. Holconibe (1899) 57 Neb. 622, 78 N. W. 300; 
Grubbs v. Ins. Co. (i8gM) o8 N. C. 472, I3 S. E. 236; Mitt. Ins. Co. v. French 
(1876) 30 Ohio, 240; see also the cases cited in 32 C. J. I3I3, and 8 A. L. R. 398, 
note. A policy may expressly provide that the insurer's duty to pay shall be merely 
suspended during a continuing breach of condition. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. 
Lindsey (I924) 32 Ga. App. 683, i24 S'. E. 369 (while premium notes remain due 
and unpaid). So the usual condition of forfeiture is by some courts construed to 
cause merely a suspension of the insurer's duty to pay during such continuing 
breach. Port Blakely Mill Co. v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. (19IO) 59 Wash. 
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even be so construed as to require it to be exercised in a very particular 
way, as by instituting legal proceedings; declaration of intention to 
rescind and tender of unearned premiums not being sufficient.7* It 
may be extinguished by the expiration of the period fixed by statute,75 
or by an incontestable clause found in the policy.78 Those cases hold- 
ing that the power to rescind persists until affirmatively waived77 
usually involve breach of the condition requiring payment of premiums, 
which goes to the whole consideration for the insurer's promise to 
pay,78 or they concerned breaches of condition that have come to the 
knowledge of the insurer only after loss. After loss, when such rights 
as the insured may have under the contract have become fixed, the 
501, io Pac. 36 (sprinkler system out of order). In such cases the insured 
remains liable on the premium notes in spite of the suspension of the insurer's 
liability. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, supra. Money paid under a policy 
cannot be recovered by the insurer upon the ground that after-discovered evidence 
showed breach of a warranty or condition. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Minch (I873) 53 
N. Y. x44; Fireten's Fund Itns. Co. v. Vinton (i921, Sup. Ct. App. T.) i9o N. Y. 
Supp. 525. 
7"Repala v. John Hancock Mit. Life Ins. Co. (i924, Mich.) 20o N. W. 465; 
Layelle v. Met. Life Ins. Co. (r922) 209 Mo. APp. 330, 238 S. W. 5041s HUMpston 
v. State Mitt. Life Assur. Co. (i923) i48 Tenn. 439, 256 S. W. 438. But in 
Minnesota it is held that the incontestable clause does not preclude the insurer from 
exercising his power of rescission by parol declaration. Indialtapolis Life Ins. Co. 
v. Aaron (1924, Miun.) 197 N. W. 757. See 3t A. L. R. io8-ii8 note. 
"By statute in Texas (Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St I914, art. 4948) the 
insurer is required to give notice within go days after the discovery of a mnisrepre- 
sentation, made in the application for insurance, of his refusal to be bound by the 
contract. See Guarantee Life Ins. Co. v. Evert (I9's, Tex. Civ. App.) I78 
S. W. 643. 
0 Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co. sufra note 68; Feierman v. Eureka Life Ins. 
Co. (Ig24) 279 Pa. 507, 124 AtI. 171; Hardy v. Phoenix Mitt. Life Ins. Co. 
(i920) X8o N. C. i8o, io4 S. E. i66. 
" "A waiver cannot be inferred from mere silence. It (the insurer] is not 
obliged to do or say anything to make the forfeiture effectual. It may wait until 
claim is made under the policy, and then in denial thereof, or in defense of a suit 
commenced therefor, allege the forfeiture." Titas v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. supra 
note 63, at p. 4I9. Richards, op. cit. sec. 143, and 2 Williston, op. cit. se"s. 746, 
753, approve this rule. Not so Mr. Ewart, who puts it thus picturesquely: "The 
effect, then, of the change from 'waiver' to election is that silence-strategy will 
be as obsolete as flint muskets, and that the law last quoted will be upheld, rather 
than that which supports the contrary view. If the company wants to cancel the 
policy, it must so elect. It cannot have a live policy for premium-catching and 
a dead one for loss-dodging." Bwart, op. cit. 3o. 
'Iowa Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis (x9o2) 187 U. S. 335, 23 SUP. Ct. 126; Tigg V. 
Register Life Ins. Co. (i91I) I52 Iowa, 720, 133 N. W. 322; Whitlow v. Sovereign 
Camsp (1925, Iowa) 202 N. W. 249; Lightner v. Prudeutial Ins. Co. (i9i6) 97 
Kan. 97, i54 Pac. A7; Burke v. Prudential Ins. Co. (I9i5) 22i Mass. 253, io8 
N. B. i069; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Ellis (i9i2) 105 Tex. 526, 147 S. W. 
1152; Conway v. Minn. MAIt. Life Ins. Co. (i9ii) 62 Wash. 49, 112 PaC. xio6; 
Belling v. N. W. Nat. Life ITs. Co. stpra note 37. See 8 A. L. R. 395, note, and 
article by Prof. A. L. Corbin, Supervening Im-possibility of Performing Conditionls 
Precedent (1922) 22 CoL. L. REV. 421, 425, 427. 
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silence of the insurer as to whether or not he will exercise his power, 
can scarcely mislead the insured to his prejudice.7 Even those courts 
which refuse to adopt the rule that failure to exercise the power to 
disaffirm within a reasonable time is to be interpreted as a waiver of 
such power, seize upon very slight circumstances to show an intention to 
"waive the forfeiture," that is, to affirm the contract, such as the 
retention of the unearned portion of a premiums even in cases where 
it is doubtful whether the insurer is under any present duty to return 
such unearned premium.8' Furthermore, it may be noted that a 
pleading is of ten an important operative fact,82 and that it is quite possible 
to regard a pleading that sets up a breach of condition as an affirmative 
defense both as an act done in exercise of a power anid a fact-com- 
munication to the court. 
Again the view that on breach of condition by the insured the 
insurer's duty is extinguished, and not merely rendered defeasible by 
the exercise of a power, appears inconsistent with the decisions that 
the insurer in the cases now under consideration may become bound 
by waivers without consideration. Our law looks with grave disfavor 
I Goorberg v. West. Assur. Co. supra note 53; Aetna Ints. Co. v. MoNunt (I9o7) 
go Miss. 642, 44 So. i62, 45 So. 835;. Benanti v. Del. Ins. Co. supra note 72; 
Homne Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilson (I9I3) iog Ark. 324, I59 S. W. III3; Steil v. Sun 
Its. Office (i9i6) III Calif. 795, I55 Pac. 72; Ruidell v. Anchor Fire Ins. Co. 
(i905) I28 Iowa, 575, IOS N. W. 1i2; New. York Cent. Ins. Co. v. Watson, supra 
note 37; Betcher v. Cap. Fire Ins. Co. (I899) 78 Minn. 240, go N. W. 97i; 
Gibson Elec. Co. v. Liverpool, L. & G. Ins. Co. supra note 6i. There are some 
cases, however, that apply the same rule where the breach of condition was known 
to the insurer before loss. See Hronish v. Home Ins. Co. (1914) 33 S. D. 428, 
146 N. W. 588 (statute); Molter v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (a909) 54 Wash. 439, 
i03 Pac. 449 (change of interest). 
' Allen v. Phoenix Ins Co. (i9o8) 14 Idaho, 728, 95 Pac. 829; Padrnos v. Cent. 
Fire Its. Co. (igog) 142 Iowa, igg, ii9 N. W. I33. But a waiver is not so readily 
implied when knowledge of the breach of condition is first acquired after loss. 
Thus in Goorberg v. West. Assur. Co. supra note 53, the court said: "Nor can the 
mere retention of the premium, after the loss has occurred, and where the liability 
is steadfastly denied, constitute either a waiver of the defense, or an estoppel." To 
the same effect is Benanti v. Del. Ins. Co. supra note 72. 
t See 2 Williston, op. cit. sec. 757. 
8 Thus the service of the writ in detinue operates as a demand for possession. 
See Vaughn v. Wood (i843) 5 Ala. 304, 307; Tunstall v. McClelland (i8o8, Ky.) 
i Bibb i86, i8g; Carraway v. McNeice (i832) I Miss. 538, 5o. The prevailing 
view is that the incontestable clause in life policies renders the setting up of a 
breach of condition in a proper pleading the only operative fact by which the 
insurer's power of rescission can be exercised. See cases cited supra note 74. So 
a statute may provide that a breach of condition can be taken advantage of only 
by special plea, and not shown under the general issue. Austin v. Prudential Ins. 
Co. (1925, Me.) I27' AtI. 276. So payment made on a policy to which insurer has 
a defense of breach of condition cannot thereafter be recovered unless fraud is 
shown. See 32 C. J. sec. 639, p. I355, and supra note 73. A formal waiver of 
record made in the course of trial, though without any consideration, extinguishes 
the insurer's privilege of setting up a breach of condition. Baird v. Kaskaski 
L. S. Ins. Co. (I924, Iowa) 200 N. W. 575. 
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upon transactions purporting to extinguish rights or create duties 
unless they are attended with a prescribed ceremonial, such as livery 
of seisin, or in later times, the sealing and delivery of a deed, in the 
case of land, or delivery, in the case of gifts of chattels, or unless they 
are supported by a consideration received for the right extinguished 
or the duty assumed. Obviously, the ceremonial or the consideration 
is required to make sure that the transaction expresses the deliberate 
intention of the party who is relinquishing the right or assuming the 
duty. But the law has no great concern for such ephemeral legal 
relations as mere privileges, or even for a power of defeasance, the 
so-called "right of forfeiture." Such privileges or power the possessor 
may give up without either consideration or ceremony. Expressed 
intention is alone sufficient. Thus a condition in a lease providing 
that in case of non-payment of the rent the lease shall be void and the 
term cease is interpreted not literally but as merely giving to the 
lessor a power of entry. This power the lessor is privileged to exer- 
cise or not to exercise as he pleases. Until he exercises it, the right- 
duty relations of lessor and lessee remain as before the breach of con- 
dition.83 This privilege and power the lessor may also "waive" 
without consideration or ceremony.8' 
Quite consistently with these principles the courts hold that the 
insurer cannot by a mere waiver assume a non-existent duty. An 
unsupported "waiver of an exception" is not binding ;85 and surely a 
naked promise made to pay for a loss occurring even a minute after 
the expiration of the policy would be unenforceable. The influence 
of this principle is also seen in those cases which declare that a 
waiver after loss, of a breach of condition occurring before loss, is 
inoperative without consideration, or "estoppel," whereas such a 
waiver before loss is binding.86 The rationale for such a distinction, 
which appears to be unsound, seems to be that after the main condition 
of the contract, the happening of the loss, has been fulfilled, there is 
no reason for interpreting the silence or inaction of the insurer as 
indicating an intention to remain bound. 
Despite the confusion of statement in the opinions, it is believed that 
whenever an issue such as that raised in Case (6) as stated above, 
that is, an unsupported waiver before loss of a breach of condition, has 
been fairly presented, such waiver has been held binding though 
Illinois Sturety Co. v. O'Brie (i9i5, C. C. A. 6th) 223 Fed. 933; Downting v. 
Cutting Packing Co. (i920) I83 Calif. 9I, igo Pac. 455; Edison Iliun, Co. v. 
Easterns Penn. Power Co. (I9I6) 253 Pa. 457, 98 Atl. 652. 
" Rex v. Paulson [1921, P. C.] i A. C. 27r. Mere inaction may be such as to 
show an intention to waive. Cuipples v. Level (ig9) 54 Wash. 299, I03 Pac. 430. 
' See supra note 54. 
Bronson v. N. W. Mitt. Life Ins. Co. supra note 6i,; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. 
Steventsont (Io) 78 Ky. I57; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Mount, supra note 79; Pearlstille 
v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. (I9C4) 70 S. C. 75, 49 S. E. 4; see 25 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 3, note. 
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without consideration or "estoppel."87 These decisions would seem to 
indicate that the duty of the insurer had not been extinguished by the 
breach of condition, but that it still persisted, subject, however, to the 
power of avoidance which the insurer was privileged to exercise. The 
unsupported waiver, therefore, does not create a duty where none 
existed before, but does extinguish the insurer's privilege and power 
to terminate an existing duty. 
This discussion makes it clear that a waiver is conventional in its 
nature, often taking the form of a true contract. Its very basis is the 
expressed or implied intention of the possessor of a legal relation to 
give it up. Hence the well settled rules that the unauthorized acts of 
an agent cannot create a waiver,88 although they may raise an estoppel; 89 
and that acts of the insurer which alone would create a waiver, such 
as demanding proofs of loss, or participation in appraisals, will not 
'Ala. Mitt. Assur. Co. v. Long Clothing Co. (i889) 123 Ala. 667, 26 So. 655; 
Caledimin; Ins. Co. v. Smith (O9M3) 65 Fla. 429, 62 So. 595; Home Fire Ins. Co. 
v. K:dzhinan supra note 39; Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Burget (igoi) 65 Ohio St. 
ng, 6x N. E. 7I2; Miller v. Union Indemnity Co. (i924) 209 App. Div. 455, 204 
N. Y. Supp. 730; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, supra note 78; Southland Life 
Ins. Co. v. Hopkins (ig20, Tex. Civ. App.) 2i9 S. W. 54. 
s Ins. Co. v. Wolff (i877) 95 U. S. 326; Conner v. Cogs. Fire Ins. Co. (i923 
S. D. Fla.) 29i Fed. io5; Porter v. Honme Friendly Soc. (i902) II4 Ga. 937, 41 
S. E. 45; Redstrake v. Cumberland Mitt. Fire Ins. Co. supra note 24; Baum- 
gartel v. Prov. Wash. Ins. Co. supra note 34- The occasional decisions holding 
that limitations upon the agent's authority to waive are invalid are caused by con- 
fusing waiver with estoppel. See Peterson v. Modern Woodmen supra note 34, 
criticised in (I925) 25 COL. L. REV. I05. 
People's Fire Its. Co. v. Goyne (i906) 79 Ark. 3I5, 96 S. W. 365; Partn v. 
Its. Co. (1901) II4 Iowa, 132, 86 N. W. 2io; Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron 
(igaa) 87 Oka. 17I, 205 Pac. I51; Wood v. Ins. Co. sitpra note 36; Sternaman 
v. Met. Life Ills. Co. (I902) 170 N. Y. i3, 62 N. E. 765; Security Life Ils. Co. 
v. Calvert (Ig07, Tex. Civ. App.) IOo S. W. 1033; So. Atl. Ins. Co. v. Hurt 
(19I3) II5 Va. 398, 79 S E. 401. Frequently this rule assumes the form that 
limitations upon the agent's authority do not apply to conditions affecting the 
inception of the policy. In-s. Co. v. Baker (i876) 94 U. S. 6io; Dulany v. Fid. & 
Cas. Co. (i9o7) io6 Md. I7, 66 Atl. 6I4. The Federal Courts, making no distinc- 
tion between waiver and estoppel, persist in holding that the insurer may, by 
limitation of his agent's authority, exempt himself from liability to estoppel 
through the agent's unauthorized fraud. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher supra note 
A;. ctna Life Ins. Co. v. Moore supra note i. But see Cont. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Chamberlain supra note I. Several of the state courts have accepted this view. 
See Iverson v. Met. Life Ils. Co. supra note x5; Salvate v. Firemn'is Inls. Co. 
supra note IS, quoting with approval the following statement from Reed v. 
Equitable F. & M. Ins. Co. supra note iS, at p. 789, 24 Atl. 833, 834; "If this 
were a new question in this state, we might feel compelled to yield to the weight 
of authority." And see N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Patten su-pra note I5; Price, How 
Far does Knowledge of an Agent Affect the Defense of Fraud in an Action Olt a 
Life Inszirance Policy? (ig94) i8 Iia.. L. REv. 377; reprinted (925) 59 AM. L. 
REV. 8o. 
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have such an effect when, accompanied by notice, either in the policy 
or elsewhere, that no waiver is intended.90 
ESTOPPELS 
We now turn to estoppels. Again we wvill assume fact situations 
typical of the two groups into which the cases involving estoppels 
usually fall, and again we will assume that the agent acting for the 
insurer has full powers. 
Case A. Jones has erected a building on leased land. He applies 
for insurance to cover the risk, giving the agent accurate information 
as to the title. The agent delivers a policy saying, "Here is your 
policy, fully covering your risk," and collects the premium payable 
for insurance of the kind applied for. Jones, acting as do a very 
large majority of ordinary prudent persons under similar circumstances, 
assumes that the agent has delivered the coverage asked for, and puts 
the policy in his safe without attempting to read it, knowing full well 
that he could not understand it if he did so. Therefore he does not 
learn, until a fire loss occurs, that the policy contains a condition that 
it shall be void if the building insured is on leased ground. 
Case B. Jones knows that his policy contains a provision avoiding 
it in case the building covered remains vacant for more than thirty 
days unless consent of the insurer thereto is endorsed on the policy. 
Jones delivers the policy to the agent with a request for such endorsed 
consent. Thereafter the policy is returned by mail accompanied by a 
letter from the agent informing Jones that the policy had been properly 
indorsed according to his request. Again Jones puts the policy in his 
safe without examination only to discover after a loss that in fact no 
such endorsement had been made. 
Let us consider analytically Case A. We look in vain for the 
elements of waiver in any of the forms discussed above. There is 
no agreement before or at the time of the delivery of the written con- 
tract altering one of its terms, such as appears in the first two cases 
of waiver as stated There is no offer, express or implied, by the 
insurer to make any such agreement, nor is there any acceptance by 
the confiding insured, who has here no actual knowledge of the 
9' See Mason-Henry Press Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (0914) 21i N. Y. 489. 
io5 N. E. 826; Tuttle v. Pac. Milt. Life Ins. Co. supra note r5; Reed v. Cont. ItS. 
Co. (zgo6 Del.) 6 Penn. 204, 65 Atl. 569. Thus furnishing blanks for proofs of 
loss does not waive an existing cause of forfeiture, especially if notice is given that 
no intention to waive exists. But it is otherwise where the insurer requests proofs 
of loss. See Supreme Tent v. Volkert (igoo) 25 Ind. App. 627, 57 N. E. 203, 
and L. R. A. 1917 A, io65, note. So the principle does not apply where one is 
truly put to his election between inconsistent courses. He cannot adopt one course 
and receive benefits thereunder, and yet retain his privilege of claiming benefits 
under the other merely by declaring that he does not intend to waive such privilege. 
See Davenport v. Tle Queen (1877 P. C.) 3 App. Cas. rii; Craine v. Col. Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co. (i9g2 Austr.) 28 C. L. R 305; 2 Williston, op. cit. secs. 68i, 684, 
687. 
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existence of the offending condition. There is no evidence whatever 
of any meeting of the minds of the parties in any attempted modifying 
agreement, which, of course, could not be shown even if it had been 
made. We do find, however, all the elements of an estoppel against 
the insurer who seeks to take advantage of the breach of condition. 
The insurer has made a false statement of a material fact-that the 
policy validly covered the risk-knowing that it would be relied on.9" 
The insured relied on the statement, as he had a right to do since he 
had no actual knowledge of its falsity,92 and his failure to read the 
policy was not such negligence as to impute knowledge to him."3 
Being so misled he both acted, in paying the premium, and refrained 
from acting, in that he made no further effort to secure insurance,94 
both to his prejudice. There seems to be no reason whatever for not 
holding the insurer estopped to deny the truth of his representation, 
whether by words, as here, or by acts, as in the more usual case, that 
the policy was valid at its inception. And of course the parol testimony 
rule has no application to proof of estoppels, which are shown not to 
modify any provisions of the contract, but to prevent the insurer from 
saying that the policy which he had falsely asserted to be valid was 
really invalid all the time.95 
t "The issuance of the policy by the company is, according to the generally 
accepted rule, a waiver of a known ground of invalidity, and equivalent to an 
assertion that the policy is valid at the time of its delivery, although the facts 
known to the company would, under the express terms of the agreement, render 
it void or voidable." 32 C. J. I343, sec. 6i8 (4.) See also Bower, op. cit. su~pra 
note I8, 37I, et seq. 
'See Unic;r Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, supra note 5; Alter v. Phwenix 
Assur. Co. supra note 8o; Lamb v. Conucil Bluffs Ins. Co. (i886) 70 Iowa, 238, 
3o N. W. 497; McElroy v. British-Ainerican Irts. Co. (i889, C. C. A. gth) 94 
Fed. 99o. Gristock v. Instrance Co. (1891) 87 Mich. 428, 49 N. W. 634; 
Bennett vu. Instrance Ca. (i887) io6 N. Y. 243, 12 N. E. 6o9; Kister v. Insurance 
Co. (I889) I28 Pa. 553, i8 AtI. 447. 
u See note ioo, infra. 
Eames v. Home Ins. Co. (}876) 94 U. S. 62; Arnold v. Americans Ins. Co. 
(i906) 148 Calif. 66o, 84 Pac. i82; Thzomipson v. Traders' Ins. Co. (I9O2) i69 
Mo. i2, 68 S. W. 88g; Frels v. Little Ins. Co. (1904) 120 Wis. 590, 98 N. W. 
522. In England it has been held that in order to establish such an estoppel the 
insured must allege and affirmatively prove that he "had been prejudically affected 
by a belief that the defendants were treating the contract as binding." Morrison 
v. Universal Marine Ins. Co. supra note i8, at p. 2o6. 
' See 2 Coke, Littleto=,* 352a; Bower, op. cit. snpra note i8, 13 et seq.; Citizens 
Bank of La. v. First Nat. Batk (i873) L. R. 6 H. L. 352. It is sometimes said 
that estoppel "is a rule of evidence which precludes a person from denying the 
truth of some statement previously made by himself." Lindley, L. J. in Low 
v. Bowverie ('191) 3 Ch. 82, io1. And see Bower, op. cit. ii. But this is a 
very misleading statement. It does not at all involve the law of evidence. See 
Ewart, Estoppel (10oo) i8q. The only reason for the statement made by the 
courts of Massachusetts, New Jersey and the United States, that parol evidence 
cannot be admitted to show an estoppel in an action on a written contract of 
insurance, is that these courts have in mind not estoppels but waivers. They con- 
sider that the plaintiff is endeavoring to prove a prior parol agreement inconsist- 
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While the doctrine of estoppel by representation has been enforced 
in courts of law for three centuries,98 its equitable origin must not be 
forgotten. The petitioner for estoppel must have clean hands. His 
claim must be made in entire good faith. If therefore the insured 
knew the real facts, he cannot honestly claim that he was misled by the 
insurer's misrepresentation. If the insured knew or had good reason 
to suspect, at the time the policy was delivered, that it was void by its 
terms, he cannot claim that he was misled by the insurer's statement 
that it was valid.y But to deprive him of his claim of estoppel the 
insured's knowledge must be such as affects his conscience and nega- 
tives his good faith, that is, actual knowledge of the facts involved in 
the claim of estoppel or of such facts as put him on inquiry. Con- 
structive or imputed knowledge is not sufficient.98 The mere fact that 
ent with a term of a written contract. Thus in Franktlin Fire Ins. Co. v. Martin 
(1873) 40 N. J. L. 568, 578, it is said: "It is manifest that the theory that such 
parol evidence, though it nay not be competent to change the written contract, 
may be received for the purpose of raising an estoppel in pais, is a mere evasion 
of the rule excluding parol testimony when offered to alter a written contract." 
"In a somewhat embryonic form it was familiar law in Lord Coke's time. 
2 Coke, Littleton,* 352a. See Pickard v. Sears (1837, K. B.) 6 A. & E. 46g; 
White v. Greenish (iB6I) ii C. B. (N. s.) 2og; Stephens v. Baird (Ik628, N. Y.) 
9 Cow. 274; State v. Mitt. Life Ins. Co. (i9io) 175 Ind. 5g,N.E. 213; Ewart, 
op. cit. supra note 95, 7. 
el Obviously if the insured actually knows at the time of the delivery of the 
policy that it is inoperative because of a breach of condition, he cannot claim 
an estoppel. Mitt. Life Ins. Co. v. Hilton-Greene (i9i6) a24i U. S. 613, 36 Sup. 
Ct. 676; Haspa v. Met. Life InTs. Co. (i907) I50 Mich. 467, i14 N. W. 380; 
Mudge v. Sup. Ct. 0. 1. F. (i907) r49 Mich. 467, i12 N. W. I130; Bratley v. 
B. 0. A. Y. (r924, Minn.) ig8 N. W. 12S; 3 Cooley, op. cit. 2569; 14 L. R A. 
(X. s.) 279, note. Such cases as Hitestess v. So. Atl. Life Ins. Co. (i90) 88 
S. C. 31, 70 S. E. 403, Sun Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips (I902, Tex. Civ. App.) 70 
S. W. 603, and Aetna Life Its. Co. v. Bockting (i906) 39 Ind. App. 586, 79 N. E. 
524, which hold the insurer estopped even though the insured knew of his breach of 
condition (false statement as to health), and even participated in the fraud of the 
insurer's agent, cannot well be defended. But even when the insured is not 
estopped to set up the fraud of the insured at the inception of the policy, his 
subsequent acceptance of premiums after acquiring knowledge of such fraud, will 
establish a waiver of the defense. Masonic Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson (1912) 149 
Ky. 80, 147 S. W. 882. 
'Back v. People's Nat. Fire Ins. Co. (i922) 97 Conn. 336, nI6 Atl. 603; 
Pfiester v. Mo. S. L. Ins. Co. supra note 32; Roe v. Nat. Life Ins. Assoc. (ipo8) 
137 Iowa, 696, ix5 N. W. Soo; Anteberg v. Cont. Cas. Co. (I922) 178 Wis. 428, 
i9o N. W. g7. The insured may, without reading the policy delivered to him, 
assume that it is in accordance with hs application. McElroy v. British-A mencan 
Ins. Co. supra note g2; N. W. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Chambers (1922) 24 Ariz. 86, 206 
Pac. io8i; Kister v. Ins. Co. supra note 92. See also cases cited I6 L R. A. 
(N. s.) I244, note. But not a few states follow the Federal courts in saying that 
insured must be presumed to know the terms of his contract. N. Y. Life .bzs. Co. 
v. Fletcher, supra note I; Layton v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. smpra note I5; Forwood 
v. Prudential Ins. Co. (i9i2) I17 Md. 254, 83 AtI. i*g. 
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he has the means of learning the truth for himself does not deprive 
him of the privilege of relying upon the insurer's representation.9" 
Hence while a general rule of law imputes to the insured knowledge 
of the terms of the policy which he accepts, such imputed knowledge 
does not negative his good faith in relying upon a representation made 
by the insurer as to the operative effect of such policy. Therefore 
it is no answer to the insured's claim that the insurer is estopped to 
deny that he is bound by the policy which he delivered as and for a 
valid contract, to say that he is presumed to know the terms of the policy 
or that he was not privileged to rely on the insurer's false representation 
when by reading the policy delivered he might have discovered the 
truth.100 
Most cases of estoppel in insurance law involve conditions affecting 
the inception of the contract, and arise under circumstances that would 
render "waivers," if really attempted, as in the Case (i) above, inoper- 
ative to affect the rights of the parties; but it is quite possible for 
estoppels to arise after tIhe inception of the contract and to affect the 
continuance of the insurer's duty validly assumed, as illustrated by. 
the facts assumed in Case (B) stated above. There the defense of the 
insurer under the vacancy clause would be barred by proof of the 
transaction whether it be regarded as raising a waiver or an estoppel. 
Hence in cases where the agent acts within his authority it makes little 
difference as to results what name may be given to it. But when the 
officiating agent is without authority to waive, the distinction becomes 
important, for such limitations do not affect the power of the agent 
to estop his principal, provided the act done is within the scope of the 
agent's employment. In Case (B) it is clear that we have no waiver 
but an estoppel.:0" To say that the agent by redelivering the unindorsed 
policy waived performance of the condition is but a misuse of terms. 
Neither of the parties had any intention of changing a term of the 
contract, or of making any other kind of waiver. The case shows a 
statement of fact by the agent which either was or should have been 
known to him to be false, and prejudicial action by the insured in bona 
Borries v. Imperial Ottonzan Bank (i873) L. R. 9 C. P. 38 (plea setting up 
estoppel; replication that defendants had "means of knowledge." Demurrer to 
replication sustained.) See also Gresham Life Assur. Soc. v. Crowther (1914) 
2 Ch. 2X9 (representee need not search land records to test truth of statement 
relied on). See Bower, op. cit. supra note 18, I73. And see dicta in Duke v. 
Ashby (i862 Exch.) 7 H. & N. 6oo, 6oX; Morton v. Woods (i869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 
293, 303 (where it was stated that tenant claiming estoppel was not charged with 
notice of contents of deed of lease); Grahlamt v. Thompson (i8n2) 55 Ark. 296, 
i8 S. W. 58. 
100 See N. W. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Chambers, sipra note 98; BusboomI v. Cap. Fire 
Ints. Co. (i924, Neb.) I97 N. WV. 957; Eaton; v. Nat. Casualty Co. (i922) 122 
Wash. 477, 2io Pac. 779. 
1'0 Redstrake v. Cumberland Mitt. Fire Ihs. Co. stpra note 24; No. River Ins. 
Co. v. Rawls (i919) 185 Ky. 509, 214 S. W. 925. The English courts find no 
difficulty in recognizing such estoppels. See Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Craine (i922 
P. C.) 2 A C. 54'. 
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fide reliance upon that statement. His ability by personal inspection 
of the policy to discover the falsity of the statement does not under 
the circumstances deprive him of the privilege to rely upon it. 
For the reasons stated, most of the confusion in decision arises in 
connection with breaches of condition that affect the inception of the 
policy. Cases (i) and (2) and (A), as stated above, or, more pre- 
cisely, similar cases in which the statements there expressly made are 
implied from the conduct of the parties, are typical of the troubled 
portion of the vast current of "waiver and estoppel" causes now 
flowing through our courts. Those courts that recognize the distinc- 
tion between waiver and estoppel sometimes apply to Cases (i) 
and (2) the same rule of estoppel properly applicable to Case (A),102 
while some other courts, notably the Federal Courts, apply to Case (A) 
the same rule that is properly applicable to Cases (I) and (2) .103 
The result in the latter courts is that estoppels are improperly excluded 
under the rule that properly excludes waivers of the substitute agree- 
ment class. 
As already shown, clear principle as well as authority precludes the 
plaintiff in Cases (i) and (2) from asserting a prior or contempora- 
neous parol modification of the terms of his policy; but unfortunately 
it is easy to misinterpret the facts of such cases so as to give them 
the appearance of estoppels. Thus it may be said of Case (i) that the 
insurer is estopped to deny the assurance that the contract would be 
treated as valid, upon which assurance the insured relied to his preju- 
dice.104 But here the elements of estoppel cannot be found. There is 
no misstatement of fact but a promise not performed. The insured 
was not deceived but disappointed in his expectation that the insurer 
would live up to the agent's promise, which, unfortunately for the 
insured, is unenforceable because of the rule of policy known as the 
parol evidence rule. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be used to 
enforce an agreement unenforceable because of that rule, or the statute 
of frauds or any other rule of policy.105 The most that can be claimed 
for the so-called "promissory estoppel" is to render detrimental conduct 
in reliance upon a promise a sufficient consideration under circum- 
stances scarcely sufficient to justify the inference that such conduct 
was bargained for by the promisor.108 
See supra note 32. 
1' See cases cited sispra in notes x, x6 and I7. 
'For example see Sovereigns Camp v. Richardson, supra note 32 (two judges 
dissenting), with notes in (0922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 778 and (ig=) 6 
Mam. L. Rxv. 597. See also Ewart, op. cit. supra note 37, 207. 
...Zeuske v. Zeuske (i909) 55 Or. 65, 103 Pac. 648, Io5 Pac. 249; Cornelius v. 
Farmers' Ins. Co. (igoi) 113 Iowa, 183, 84 N. W. I037; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Hall supra note 31. "An estoppel cannot arise upon a promise as to future action 
with respect to a right to be acquired upon an agreement not yet made." Union 
Mit. Life Ins. Co. v. Mouwry supra note 3I. See i6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1255, note; 
21 C. J. 11II. 
"' See i Williston, op. cit. sec. 139. 
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As indicated above, the Federal courts and two of the state courts 
have fallen into the contrary and even more unfortunate error of 
assuming that the parol evidence rule, which prevents the enforce- 
ment of the substitute agreement "waivers" in Cases (I) and (2), is 
equally applicable to exclude proof of the estoppel sought to be shown 
in Case (A). This holding is not due to any unwillingness on the part 
of the Federal Supreme Court to allow equitable estoppels to be set up 
in actions at law, for it has permitted such estoppels to be shown even 
in an action of ejectment to defeat a claim resting upon a clear legal 
title.'07 It is rather due to a failure to recognize the existence of an 
estoppel in such cases as distinguished from a waiver. Throughout 
the long opinion in the Northern Assurance Company case waiver and 
estoppel are constantly confused, the ruling idea being that the. real 
purpose of the offered proof, by whatever name called, was to alter 
the terms of the contract. That this attitude still persists is apparent 
from the language of the court in Lumber Underwriters v. Rife,'08 
where a possible distinction between a waiver and an estoppel is not 
even suggested, and proof of a clear estoppel is excluded in the belief 
that it was a waiver. 
The same failure to make the distinction between waiver and 
estoppel, now so firmly fixed by the decisions of the other states, is 
evident in the opinions of the courts of Mhssachusetts and New Jersey, 
althouggh in New Jersey the distinction is clearly discerned and pointed 
oht in cases like that stated in Case (B) above.'09 It may be said of the 
decisions of the courts of these two states, as it cannot be said of those 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, that they have at least been 
consistent. 
The growing solidarity of the United States as a commercial unit 
powerfully aids the tendency to make commercial law uniform through- 
out the nation. It is intolerable that the Federal courts should continue 
to enforce, with respect to so important a commercial contract as the 
insurance policy, a rule that has been repudiated by a vast majority of 
the state courts, and is inconsistent alike with sound reason and fair 
dealing. Let us hope that the Northern Assurance Company case will 
soon be added to the list of insurance cases in the Federal Supreme 
Court reports that have been recently overruled or distinguished 
away,110 and the doctrine of the Wilkinson case re-established. 
" See Drexel v. Berney (i887) 122 U. S. 24I, 7 SUP. Ct. 10oo; Kirk v. Hanzil- 
ton (s88o) io2 U. S. 68. 
10 Sapra note 9. 
" Redstrake v. Cumberland Mitt. Fire Ins. Co. supra note 24. 
See Grigsby v. Russell (i9ii) 222 U. S. i49, 32 Sup. Ct 58, which repudiates 
the doctrine, if not the decision, in Warwock v. Davis (i81) 104 U. S. 775; and 
N. W. Mitt. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson (i92o) 254 U. S. 96, 4I Sup. Ct. 47, which 
practically overrules Ritter v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1898) i69 U. S. I39, I8 
Sup. Ct. 300. 
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